The feasibility and potential desirability of incorporating organization development techniques into the Marine Corps' leadership training program by Farlow, Timothy Norman
THE FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL
DESIRABILITY OF INCORPORATING
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES















Thesis Advisor: R.A. McGoniqal









2. GOVT ACCESSION NO 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (end Submit)
The Feasibility and Potential Desirabili-
ty of Incorporating Organization Develop-
ment Techniques into the Marine Corps
'
Leadership Training Program
5. TYRE OF REPORT * PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
September 1977
• . PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AuTHORr*; . CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
Timothy Norman Farlow
» PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 9 3940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA 4 WORK UNIT NUMBERS





13. NUMBER OF PACES
83
* MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 AOORESSY" dltloront from Controlling Olllca) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ot thlo rdpert)
Unclassified
IS«. OECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol thlo Report)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
'7- DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT e< iho oeotrect entered In Block 30, It different from Report)
IB. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
It. KEY WORDS (Continue on roreroo no- II neeoooory end identity oy blooit number)
Organization Development Techniques
Marine Corps' Leadership Training Program
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on rovoroo «>«• It %mry end Identity ey »'•«*
Numerous social and political changes of the past two
decades have affected the quality and quantity of personnel
assets available to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has
been subject to an increasing number of society-born
problems and internally-generated conflicts. New and
increased demands have been placed upon Marine Corps




EDITION OF I NOV Sk IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-014- 6601 i UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Dmtm Entered)
UK
UNCLASSIFIED
fcCuWlTv CLASSIFICATION Of This P«G£f*1'»i ttmtm EnfrmJ
(20. ABSTRACT Continued)
corps' values and culture; 2) Remedy negative incidents
that erode existing assets and threaten vitally-needed
political support; and 3) Maintain combat effectiveness.
The Marine Corps has instituted a variety of human
resource management programs to correct the dysfunctions
of personnel unrest. The primary thrust of these programs
is the leadership training program. Although it has met
with initial success, disciplinary problems and personnel
conflicts continue to plague the Corps. In order to
improve the program's effectiveness, this thesis
investigates the potential desirability and feasibility
of incorporating organization development (OD) methods
into the program. The thesis examines the tenents of OD
and internal Marine Corps factors which could support or
hinder the introduction of OD concepts. The thesis
concludes that OD methods would be feasible if they were
designed for the unique needs of the Corps and initially
concentrated on improving channels of communication and
resolving local unit conflicts. The thesis continues





S, N 0102-014-6601 ^ secu»i'v classification o* this mcer***" o«*« *«<•'«<*;
LEVI
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited




Marine Corps ' Leadership Training Program
by
Timothy Norman Farlow
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.S., Purdue University, 1971
MBA, University of South Carolina, 1977
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of








Numerous social and political changes of the past two
decades have affected the quality and quantity of personnel
assets available to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps
has been subject to an increasing number of society-born
problems and internally-generated conflicts. New and
increased demands have been placed upon Marine Corps leader-
ship to: 1) Assimilate today's young Marine into the corps'
values and culture; 2) Remedy negative incidents that erode
existing assets and threaten vitally-needed political
support; and 3) Maintain combat effectiveness.
The Marine Corps has instituted a variety of human
resource management programs to correct the dysfunctions of
personnel unrest. The primary thrust of these programs is
the leadership training program. Although it has met with
initial success, disciplinary problems and personnel con-
flicts continue to plague the Corps. In order to improve
the program's effectiveness, this thesis investigates the
potential desirability and feasibility of incorporating
organization development (OD) methods into the program. The
thesis examines the tenents of OD and internal Marine Corps
factors which could support or hinder the introduction of OD
concepts. The thesis concludes that OD methods would be feasi-
ble if they were designed for the unique needs of the Corps
and initially concentrated on improving channels of communica-
tion and resolving local unit conflicts. The thesis continues
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the feasibility and potential
desirability of incorporating certain organization develop-
ment techniques into the Marine Corps leadership training
program. The author proposes that particular OD techniques,
limited in scope and carefully designed so as to take into
consideration the uniqueness of the Marine Corps as an
institution, can be successfully incorporates into the
leadership training program in order to reduce potential
sources of unit dysfunctions and Corps-wide embarrassments.
Specifically, the thesis recommends that open discussions
of local unit conflicts through the utilization of discussion
leaders trained in the OD techniques of team-building and
conflict-resolution could result in strengthened espirit
d' corps and increased combat effectiveness.
This thesis holds the basic premise that the Marine
Corps is a microcosm of the larger American society. In
the past two decades, the Marine Corps' supporting society
has undergone fundamental changes which have altered the
values and priorities of American life and consequently the
norms and needs of the personnel pool from which recruits
are acquired. Such phenomena as increased minority self-
awareness, the war in Vietnam, the emergence of a cynical
and politically aware "youth culture", demographic changes,
and the opinion-shaping power of the mass media have
fit
IN
contributed to sweeping social, moral, and economic changes.
Consequently, the quality and quantity of personnel and
material assets available to the Marine Corps have been
affected so as to present new challenges to the Corps 1
leadership. Moreover, due to increased social and political
pressures, the Marine Corps cai> ill-afford negative and
embarrassing incidents which threaten to undermine its
national support base.
This thesis accepts Gross' (1964), Katz and Kahn '
s
(1966), and Robbins ' (1974) convictions that conflict is an
intrinsic part of organizational life. [Refs 31, Ch. 1;
42, Ch. 1; 68, pp. 12-13] Conflict in the Marine Corps
is either society-born or internally-generated. While this
conflict has resulted in significant disciplinary problems
and erosion of personnel assets, the Marine Corps appears
to react according to traditional leadership which tends
to place it in a reactive posture when the demands of the
time is one of proaction. However, this thesis maintains,
that to assume that traditional leadership will be success-
ful without any changes is tantamount to thinking that
today ' s young male and female marines are the products of
yesterday's society.
The Marine Corps has reacted to its internal conflicts
by instituting a variety of human resource management pro-
grams. The most visible and costly of these programs is
the current leadership training program. However, this
thesis explains, the leadership training program has been

handicapped by its structure and conduct in achieving full
effectiveness. This thesis explores the philosophies of
Organization Development as a possible means to upgrade
the program's effectiveness. A review of the literature
and the theories of major practitioners are examined in a
manner that would tend to validate this assumption.
This thesis continues to discuss the internal Marine
Corps organizational structure, reward systems, and cultural
atmosphere which either support or inhibit the concepts of
OD. The thesis examines a variety of forces (both formal
and informal) which can possibly promote or possibly deter
the successful introduction of OD efforts.
In conclusion, the author recommends that the OD goal
of improving organizational channels of communication (both
horizontally and vertically) holds great potential benefit
for the Marine Corps. The thesis presents a framework whereby
OD techniques can be incorporated into the current leadership
training program in order to improve inter-unit communication
and manage disruptive conflicts. Yet, the thesis recognizes
such OD techniques must be initially limited in scope and
specifically tailored to the unique needs of the Marine Corps
in order for them to be structurally feasible and culturally
acceptable. This caution is based on the knowledge that
an organization's symbolic fabric is a fragile component
whose warp and woof gives the organization its unique
character. After careful investigation, the author believes

that the incorporation of specific OD techniques into the
leadership training program would present little risk of
damage to the Corps as a system. Rather, the author
believes that the Corps and its personnel would be better
able to interact positively thus upgrading espirit d' corps
and combat effectiveness.

II. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
The United States Marine Corps is a component subsystem
of the larger United States defense establishment and
national security system. The national security system, in
turn, is an integral part of the general socio-politico-
economic structure prevailing in the United States at any
given time. Consequently, the United States Marine Corps
as related to its external environment does not exist in
"splendid isolation" and probably fits with a degree of
firmness Johnson, Kast, and Rosenzweig's (1963) definition
of a system: "An organized and complex whole; an assemblage
or combination of things or parts forming a complex or
unitary whole." [Ref. 40, pp. 4-6] The term system also
implies an interdependence whereby what happens to one
component affects all others composing the whole in varying
degrees of impact. In this respect the relationship existing
between the Marine Corps, the defense establishment, and
the greater American society follows Bertalanf fy ' s (1956)
concise definition of a system: "Elements standing in
interaction". [Ref. 32, p. 6]
Given this subsystem relationship of the Marine Corps
and the constellation of defense institutions (Army, Navy,
Air Force, et al) to general society, the system theory
research of Leavitt (1965) and Seiler (1967) notes that such
associations must involve interdependence and exchange.
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[Refs. 46, pp. 1145-1146; 71, pp. 23-29] The more effectively these
exchanges and interfaces are managed in terms of utilizing
inputs, the less the subsystem is subject to atrophy, becoming
marginal or obsolete, or going out of existance. To remain
in dynamic interface with its external environment, a sub-
system must react positively to the new demands and changing
conditions of its environment. To ignore public pressure
and societal expectations is to court organizational disaster.
Since the Marine Corps is an instrument of the federal
government (a democratic, popularly-elected assembly), it
cannot exist in "Olympian detachment" from the remainder of
American society. Having received its raison d'etre from
the National Security Act of 1947, the United States Marine
Corps is responsible to the national public for the effec-
tive utilization of its assets. According to the concepts
of system theory, to remain a viable subsystem of national
defense the Marine Corps must be sensitive to developing
social and political pressures and adaptive to changing
conditions. Since it is an agent of a democratic, free
society which places a premium on human rights, the United
States Marine Corps does not enjoy the dubious luxury of
insulation from popular demands as do the military forces
of more totalitarian national states. Consequently, in
receiving its mandate and resources from a free society,
it follows that the Marine Corps cannot ignore the "cues"
of society. As noted by French and Bell (1973) , external
interface with society is an increasingly conspicuous and

impactive aspect of organizational life. [Ref. 26; pp. 82-83J
How the numerous interface problems with society are managed
can have vital consequences for the success, health, or
viability of an organization. This concern is especially
immediate in today's era of sophisticated news media tech-
nology where negative incidents such as racial disturbances
or sex discrimination (regardless of how minor or isolated)
can be readily escalated and become so newsworthy as to bring
severe external pressure upon the Marine Corps.
Essentially, the United States Marine Corps is a govern-
mental subsystem which utilizes society-provided inputs
(men and capital) to generate an output (accomplishment of
prescribed military mission) . Since its resources are
procured from the public, the quality and quantity of these
inputs are functions of national priorities and values.
Further, the United States (unlike most totalitarian states)
is a pluralistic society which in recent years has undergone
complex and profound changes in its complexion. To varying
degrees these increasingly rapid changes have manifested
themselves in many institutions of society. Whereas any
organism is what it eats, similarly public organizations
(e.g., the United States Marine Corps) are affected and
altered by the quality and quantity of their resource diets.
Just as an organism must manage and adjust its diet to remain
viable, so must the Marine Corps address the changing menu
(i.e., resources) which is presented by society.
12

Probably the most rapid changes in American social values
and priorities (which control and color the resources avail-
able to the Marine Corps) occurred in the two decades between
"Brown versus the Board of Education" (1954) and the political
scandals attending the Watergate investigations (1974) . The
former ushered in the "Negro Revolt" while the latter under-
wrote the increasing skepticism of U.S. citizens (and young
people, in particular) for political institutions. Events
of this period fostered and validated the cynicism of large
numbers of American youth who increasingly engaged in dis-
turbing life styles and behavior bordering on revolt when
compared with the traditional social values then current
[Ref. 78, Ch. 1] During this era events transpired which
when sensationalized by the mass media lent discredit to many
of the country's most revered institutions associated with
security, e.g., the unpopular war in Viet Nam, police sup-
pression of Civil Rights demonstrations, unconstitutional
FBI and CIA activities, etc.
The catalytic agent which generated national cynicism,
distrust of governmental institutions, and rejection of many
traditional values was, perhaps, the "Negro Revolt". During
the mid and late 1960s, blacks who had suffered the stigma
of second class citizenship reacted both physically and
psychologically. The racial violence of Watts, Newark, and
Detroit was attended by the insistence of Black militants
on defining themselves on their own terms instead of allowing
the White majority to continue to define them. Such slogans
13

as "Black is Beautiful" underlined the separation of Black
identity from the cultural norms of White America. The
writings of Eldridge Cleaver (1968) and James Baldwin (1963)
are indicative of the rising tide of Black awareness and
ethnic pride. [Ref. 17, Ch. 1-4; 5, Ch. 1-3] Blacks demanded
increased personal respect and better employment opportunities
based on ability instead of color.
The impetus of the Black protest movements was keenly
felt in the Armed Forces . Reports by correspondents during
the late 1960s stressed the change in attitude among per-
ceptible numbers of Black servicemen. Foner (1974) states
that Time magazine reported: "These men are a new generation
of Black soldiers. Unlike the veterans of a year or two ago,
they are immersed in Black awareness and racial pride."
[Ref. 24, p. 20] Although Blacks had traditionally demanded
complete equality of treatment within the armed forces, they
now demanded official recognition of their distinctive life-
style and culture. In this, Black servicemen were reflecting
the changes in the larger Black community and its conscious-
ness. Blacks engaged in self-imposed separation, especially
off the job, and in displays of racial pride and solidarity
along with quick reactions to what they felt were racial
slights, acts of discrimination, or racist behavior whether
conscious or imagined. [Ref. 24, p. 207]
The continuing war in Viet Nam alienated the moderate,
non-violent wing of the Civil Rights movement. Up until his
assassination in April 1968, Dr. iMartin Luther King spoke
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out against the war with increasing sharpness. Black critics
of the war charged that it drained resources needed to improve
the conditions of Blacks at home. Thomas A. Johnson, a black
reporter, wrote in the New York Times ; "This is the first
time in the history of American wars that national Negro
leaders are not urging Black youth to take up arms in support
of American policy to improve the lot of the Black man in the
United States." [Ref. 24, p. 206]
The rising tide of Black militance increasingly dismissed
Black career personnel in the Armed Services as "Uncle Toms"
and "Oreos". Young Blacks complained that discrimination
pervaded the entire military system as evidenced by: racial
and cultural biased tests that relegated Blacks to assignments
in the infantry, artillery, or low-skilled jobs; the lack of
sensitivity among white military superiors to Black cultural
identity; the military justice system which subjugated Blacks
to a seemingly disproportionate number of pre-trial confine-
ments and "Article 15s"; and the perceived "railroading" of
activist personnel before the expiration of enlistment via
administrative discharges. Blacks in uniform directed their
society-born dissatisfaction against the military. In 1970,
re-enlistment rates among Black personnel fell to a new low
of 12.8 per cent. Moreover, serious racial incidents
erupted at many stateside and overseas installations. The
United States Marine Corps witnessed one of the most serious
incidents at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina where a White
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corporal died of injuries sustained in a clash between White
and Black Marines. Foner reports that in a February 1970
survey of racial attitudes, sixty-eight per cent of the Blacks
questioned felt the Marine Corps "had failed to practice its
preachments on racial equality." [Ref. 24, p. 215] The survey
also revealed that the longer a man remained in the Marine
Corps the more biased he became. [Ref. 24, p. 215] In
response to these pressing problems the Marine Corps initiated
a research project in April 1970 that resulted in the formal
training of Human Relations Instructors and the mandatory
attendance of all Marines at Human Relations classes.
The "Negro Revolt" with its resulting rise in Black
consciousness and political awareness has made new demands
upon American society. The Civil Rights demonstrations and
ethnic militancy of past years have sensitized American Blacks
to the political clout they possess. Blacks are no longer
content with basic integration but demand an active role in
the administration of national institutions. In composing
the largest bloc of this country's minority groups, Blacks
have traditionally spearheaded the drive for equal rights.
The power sharing enjoyed by other minority groups is deter-
mined to a large degree by the events transpiring in Black-
White relations. As a subsystem of the federal government,
the Marine Corps is subject to these political and social
pressures. Increasingly effective human resource management
programs are a means whereby the Marine Corps can strive to
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deal positively with new minority expectations, continue to
tap this vast personnel pool, yet maintain its own internal
standards, traditions, and values.
The evolution of the "Negro Revolt" was accompanied by
changes in the social values of White American society.
Although these changing priorities were initially confined
to members of the upper middle class, their influences were
felt to varying degrees in most segments of American society.
The wake of this social unrest was attended on the part of
U.S. citizens by increased skepticism of societal and
governmental institutions, questioning of traditional American
values, and a frequently severe distrust of authority figures.
Leon Friedman (1968) ascribes this conflict as initially
born of the Civil Rights movement:
"When Southern racists reacted as they did
in Birmingham, St. Augustine, or Selma, the
conscience of America was thoroughly aroused.
Few were not affected in some way by the
pictures of snarling dogs and firehoses at
Birmingham, the beatings on the beach at
St. Augustine, and the murders in Neshoba
County and Selma." [Ref. 27, p. 70]
Perceived police brutality, indifference of politicians, and
the seeming reluctance of society to institute immediate
changes inflamed the conscience of middle class youth and
heightened their frustrations. David Loye (1971) clearly
details the bitterness and dissolusion of this period.
[Ref. 51, Ch. 2]
The continuing escalation of the war in Viet Nam was
perceived by White youth as further evidence of the reluctance
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of the established order to respond to popular sentiment.
Dutton (1972) describes the rejection by youth to "work
within the system" and the contagious effect of the "up
against the wall, baby!" syndrome. [Ref. 21, Ch. 4] More-
over, he notes how material affluence and rising expectations
permitted middle class youth the luxury of denouncing the
existing system in favor of rearranged economic and social
values. [Ref. 21, Ch. 10] These same liberating tendencies
were also clearly discernible in the youth from working
class and poorer families, even if less dramatically."
'This is not just a new generation 1 , Time noted in naming
the group a collective "Man of the Year" before it was even
twenty-one years old, 'but a new kind of generation 1 ."
[Ref. 22, p. 27] The social upheaval generated by American
youth was manifested by seven years of teach-ins and demonstra-
tions, five years of large scale draft resistance and emigra-
tion, four years of universal disillusionment, the creation
of a mood among voters that unseated an incumbent President,
defeated his designated successor, and provided a Presidential
mandate to "end the war". [Ref. 22, Ch. 1] At Washington,
D.C. in May 1971, the largest occurrence of civil disobedience
in U.S. history produced nearly 13,000 arrests.
Heren (1970) addresses the cultural revolution of American
youth and the accompanying technological revolution of the
mass media whereby large segments of the public were directly
exposed to the violence of racial clashes, the slaughter in
18

Viet Nam, the apparent unending confrontation on the streets
and campuses, the copouts , dropouts, acid heads, and
assassinations of national figures. [Ref. 34, pp. 180-230]
Rationalism seemed to be disregarded as affluent, expectant,
and angry youth challenged the old disciplines. Social
strife was complex because so many forces were involved, and
was often triggered by events that had little apparent
connection with the acts of violence. O'Neill (1971)
comments on the erosion of personal identity and social
responsibility that accompanied the inflammatory rhetoric
and violence of the New Left, Students for a Democratic
Society, and the radical Weatherman factions. [Ref. 64,
pp. 275-305]
As a repository of traditional values of discipline and
authority and as the most visible institution embroiled in
Viet Nam, the U.S. military came under bitter, sustained
attack. This anti-war sentiment given birth during the
unpopular war in Viet Nam has produced another offspring,
anti-military sentiment in the U.S., which may in the long
run prove to be a more formidable enemy to the services than
its antecedent. Additionally, the aftermath of the "Negro
Revolt" and the shifts in societal values (e.g., rising
consciousness of women, concern for "people programs" vice
technological hardware, orientation towards "pluralism"
vice "melting pot", skepticism of government institutions,
etc.) have created a mid-1970s climate which poses increased
challenges for those concerned with military effectiveness.
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The potential enlistee comes to the Armed Forces with a
"mind set" conditioned by the social turbulence of the 1960s
and early 70s. While these enlistees may lack the tightly
ordered mental discipline gained from the printed page —
as indicated by alarmingly high illiteracy rates [Ref. 81,
p. 8] — they do possess a precocity and complex perception
of events developed from radio and television. They appear
extremely aware of social issues and seem to demand oppor-
tunities for self-esteem and personal growth. This places
new demands on any military leadership strictly anchored on
authoritarian dictates. The "why" generation is not content
with command by fiat but needs open communications to be
fully integrated into military organizations. Moreover,
population trends reveal that this personnel pool is rapidly
shrinking. In a speech given at Arizona State University,
R.J. Murray, Under Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs,
stated that "by 1980, 43% of the eligible male population
will have to be recruited to meet required manning levels."
[Ref. 60]
Demographic studies also indicate that the military must
increasingly rely on minority group members to fill its
ranks. [Ref. 76, pp. 50-51] Furthermore, positions tradi-
tionally occupied by White males will probably be filled by
females. [Ref. 67, pp. 55-61] In addressing the need for
fuller utilization of women in meeting manpower requirements,
former Secretary of Defense, Elliot P. Richardson, commented:
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"We need to make more and better use of
women. We say this not just because we're
for, in principle, the idea of assuring the
equality of opportunity for women. We're
not talking about the Department of Defense
or the Services as instruments for putting
an end to the vestiges of discrimination
toward women. We're talking about the very
direct interests of the Services, for their
own purposes, in doing a better job for the
United States in the era of the All-Volunteer
Force. We're not thinking in terms of what
we can do for women, we're thinking in terms
of what women can do for us and the national
security. And I'm not sure we're asking
them to do enough." [Ref. 83, pp. 8-9]
Skillful, innovative human resource management programs
can provide a means of integrating women and minorities into
the cultural climate of the Armed Forces, improving the
skills of current military personnel, strengthening retention
rates, and presenting potential enlistees with a climate
conducive to personal growth and self-esteem. Such multi-
dimensional efforts are needed to procure and retain military
resources in this era of the All Volunteer Force.
As a highly visible component of the broader spectrum
of American social institutions, the Marine Corps can utilize
effective human resource management programs to:
A. Assimilate the values of a new generation of enlistees
into espirit d' corps thereby enhancing organizational effec-
tiveness and commitment.
B. Assume a proactive stance towards negative situations
(racial disturbances, sex discrimination, etc.) that could
be exploited by the mass media and result in weakened




Human Resource Management is not a luxury to be indulged
in according to the whim of the individual commander. The
climate of the supporting U.S. society and the keen competi-
tion for defense resources demand skillfully tailored HRM
programs to maintain a continuing mandate for the Marine
Corps. The price of HRM failures is too costly to be left
to chance. Indeed, vigorous HRM programs carefully designed
to match the Marine Corps' uniqueness may possibly be the
only way to simultaneously preserve the Marine Corps'
traditional values while maintaining its viability of
mission. Yet, probably the greatest obstacle retarding the
acceptance of updated HRM programs necessary to insure the
Marine Corps' continuing effectiveness is the reluctance of
many Marine Corps leaders (at all levels) to fully subscribe
to the non-traditional concept that human growth and
organizational goals are not mutually exclusive properties.
22

III. THE LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM
The United States Marine Corps is probably America's
most honored fighting force, justifiably proud of its past.
"It is one of this nation's most venerable institutions."
[Ref. 11, p. vii] The Marine Corps has developed a history
of combat excellence that is equalled by few of the world's
fighting organizations. Yet, the Marine Corps is now
experiencing an embarrassing growth in disciplinary problems
and negative incidents that jeopardize the elite reputation
of which it, and the nation, are so rightly proud.
Department of Defense data from fiscal years 1971 to 1975
indicate that the Marine Corps is experiencing not only a
significantly higher rate of disciplinary problems than any
other service but also a rate that, with few exceptions, has
been growing over the past several years. [Ref. 11, p. 62]
Indeed, the Marine Corps* 1975 rates of courts-martial,
desertion incidents, and absences without official leave
AWOL) far exceed the combined rates of the Air Force, Navy,
and Army. [Ref. 11, p. 63] The Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General Louis H. Wilson, has publicly expressed his
strong dissatisfaction with the "deplorable" disciplinary
statistics. [Ref. 11, p. 64] Although comparisons of service
disciplinary rates are difficult because of differing
standards and punishment policies, the Marine Corps is
experiencing serious problems which have brought public
23

embarrassment to its elite reputation. Moreover, the Marine
Corps has been forced to expend considerable amounts of
valuable time, critically needed elsewhere, to counteract
"bad press" and to answer inquiries by Congressional
committees. Indeed, one indication of the disturbing degree
of internal Marine Corps problems exists in the fact that in
one three month period alone (July to September 1975) more
than two thousand Marines were discharged for inability to
conform to the Corps' standard of discipline. [Ref. 1, p. 16]
Marine Corps leaders are acutely aware of the grave
threats presented by such erosions of the Corps' personnel
assets. In an era of increasingly scarce defense resources,
commanders fully realize that maximization of existing assets
and accomplishment of organization mission are seriously
jeopardized by disciplinary problems, racial unrest, substance
abuse, and similar dysfunctional phenomena. Concern for such
problems has been expressed by several Marine officers
writing in unofficial publications. One suggested that:
"The three Divisions would be hard-pressed to field one full-
strength division prepared for combat." [Ref. 43, p. 18]
Another officer stated: "My recent experience in Okinawa
convinced me without a doubt that the Battalion Landing Teams
that go afloat are not adequately prepared for combat or
amphibious assault." [Ref. 79, p. 41] While the dismay of
such observers is partly based on logistical concerns,
disciplinary trends are a seriously corrosive influence on
organizational effectiveness (i.e., combat success).
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Consequently, to countervene disruptive forces either gen-
erated internally or transplanted into the Corps ' from the
external civilian society, a variety of human resource
management programs have been initiated. These programs
have been specifically tailored to the organizational cli-
mate of the Marine Corps and are directed at improving
organizational health (i.e., more effective accomplishment
of mission) through a more positive utilization of existing
human resources.
The most visible of current Marine Corps efforts to
maximize the potential of its human resources and combat
organizational conflicts is the leadership training program.
As compared to other human resource management programs
(Equal Opportunity, Alcohol Abuse, Drug Rehabilitation,
etc.), the leadership training program occupies the time,
attention, and involvement of the greatest number of marines.
It has the full endorsement of the Commandant as a method
to improve unit effectiveness: "This program has my full
support ... I expect nothing less from all Marines." [Ref. 82,
para. 3]
The heritage of the leadership training program is
described by official directive:
"During the late 1960s, the Marine Corps
underwent a period of accelerated change
characterized by rapid expansion, the
accession of an increasing number of
minority members, exposure to new ideas,
and rising expectations among its members,
placing heavy demands on leadership. To
assist in contending with this change, the
Marine Corps initiated a human relations
25

training program. The program's basic
objective was, through education and
action, to ensure more constructive
relationships among Marines and between
Marines and individuals outside the Marine
Corps. Initial emphasis was placed on
resolving racial problems. Subsequently,
the Marine Corps moved to provide a more
comprehensive leadership approach that would
eliminate the need for a separate human
relations training program." [Ref. 55, p. 2]
The core concept of this initial program remains in the
current leadership training program: The Dual-Life Theory.
Developed by American Institutes for Research, this philosophy
stressed the Janus-like complexion of human nature: All
persons have two strong internal drives, the drive for self-
preservation (including family and close friends) , and the
desire for society in general to survive. [Ref. 39, Vol. Ill]
Discussions oriented on this dual-life value emphasize respect
for self and respect for others as the locus from which preju-
dice and discrimination can be eradicated. The commonality
and mutual inter-dependence of people are used as means to
offset forces of divergence. From this beginning and retaining
this essential philosophy the leadership training program
has been expanded and developed to incorporate cross-cultural
relationships, sexism vis-a-vis the role of women in the
Marine Corps, and race relations with special emphasis on
institutional discrimination.
As officially defined, the object of the Marine Corps'
leadership training program is to "... develop the leadership
quality of all Marines to enable them to assume progressively
greater responsibilities to the Marine Corps and society..."
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[Ref. 55, p. 1] Moreover, as the Commandant has stated:
"The fundamental objective of this program, insofar as the
Marine Corps is concerned, is based on the basic need for
unity of effort in both war and peace." [Ref. 82, para. 1]
This comprehensive program designed to improve organizational
health is clearly anchored on leadership which the Marine
Corps holds to be a primary determinant of unit effectiveness.
Leadership is defined as "... the sum of those qualities
of intellect, human understanding, and moral character that
enable a person to inspire and control a group successfully . . .
'
[Ref. 54, para. 5390] It is through the effective leader
that an organization realizes its maximum potential. The
Marine Corps has long stressed the vital necessity of military
superiors (both officer and enlisted) to combine leadership
with their titular authority. As expressed by the Commandant:
"The vast majority of Marines will respond to the most exacting
standards, provided concerned leadership sets the example."
[Ref. 82, para. 3]
Official directives express the thrust of the leadership
training program and the techniques to be utilized (and
avoided) in its employment:
"Leadership training will emphasize the
dignity of each individual Marine and the
quality of human understanding, and will be
conducted in accordance with recognized and
proven traditional military techniques and
principles. Commanders must guard against
the employment of leadership training tech-
niques inconsistent with Marine Corps poli-
cies and a mission-oriented approach.
Techniques that unduly impinge on personal
privacy or which foster a perception of
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lowered standards of personal discipline
will not be used. Specialist techniques
derived from psychotherapy, laboratory
games used in group therapy, encounter
groups, sensitivity training sessions,
emotional confrontations , use of first
names, unstructured rap sessions, touch-
feel games, transactional analysis,
transcendental meditation and structural
analysis are prohibited." [Ref. 55, p. 2]
Within these parameters, the program is designed to
enhance personnel welfare and mission accomplishment. It
is emphasized that the Marine Corps is mission-oriented and
is not a psychological counseling service. Moreover, lack
of training expertise and material resources prohibit the
widespread introduction of intensive, sophisticated counseling
techniques
.
The Head, Equal Opportunity Branch (Code MPE) is respon-
sible to the Director, Manpower Plans and Policy Division
(Code MP) for the development, implementation, and monitoring
of the leadership training program. Through the Leadership
Instruction Department (LID) located at Quantico, Virginia,
unit discussion leaders are trained from personnel at The
Basic School and Staff NCO Academies; graduates of inter-
mediate level schools are trained as leadership instructors
.
Additionally, LID's duties also include the utilization of
mobile training teams to provide leadership discussion
training to selective field commands. When directed by CMC
these mobile teams also conduct research, test materials,
collect data, and provide staff assistance to field commanders
Organizational commanders are responsible for the local
implementation of the leadership training program by the
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employment of LID-trained personnel. Within this framework
all marines - regardless of position of authority - undergo
sixteen to twenty- four hours of classroom training annually.
The size of these discussion groups range from approximately
seven to twenty personnel who are representatives of a
common unit. The training discussion emphasizes human
understanding and individual dignity as the foundation upon
which disciplined, spirited combat units are built. The
discussion attempts to open lines of communication between
marines across barriers of rank, age, race, and sex. Commanders
are encouraged to require some officers and Staff NCOs to
attend each discussion group and fully participate in the
training in order to bring experience and proven leadership
to the group.
The format of the discussion group includes three
components
:
A. Orientation - This first component provides the
discussion members with an overview of the program, provokes
thoughts for the discussions to follow, and motivated mem-
bers to engage in full and meaningful participation. [Ref. 63,
p. 1-5] The orientation phase addresses worldwide human
relations problems that challenge modern leadership.
B. Discussion - The discussion component is the educa-
tional phase. Through a set of printed discussion material,
this phase utilizes the dual-life value to improve awareness
of human relations problems both domestically and foreign.
The discussion leader must be prepared to supplement the
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prepared material by interjecting current events and local
issues. The discussion phase is considered successful to
the degree that it stimulates discussion members to implement
the classroom material in their daily lives. [Ref. 61,
ch. 2-5]
C. Individual Action - This third phase is the desired
result of the orientation and education components. The
scope of this phase is broad but essentially consists of a
voluntary effort by marines to apply their leadership train-
ing outside the classroom It stresses that unit improvement
is greatly facilitated by "... self-improvement and construc-
tive interpersonal relations with marines of all racial,
ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds, between marines
and members of the other Armed Services, and between marines
and civilians at home and overseas ..." [Ref. 62, part 5]
In endorsing the leadership training program, the Commandant
has stated: "... All officers, staff noncommissioned offi-
cers and noncommissioned officers are expected to become
fully involved in the current leadership training program ..."
[Ref. 26, para. 3] Moreover, he added: "It is a matter
of military necessity that this education/action training
program continue to be pursued with dedication." [Ref. 26,
para. 1] The role of the Commanding Officer is especially
vital to the success of the program. The Leadership Symposium
hosted by the Commandant in Arlington, Virginia from 7-11
March 1977 reaffirmed that the Commanding Officer's support
is necessary to enhance the validity of the program. The
Symposium stated in part:
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"While it is understood that Commanding
Officers cannot personally lead all dis-
cussion groups, they can: (a) Introduce
training sessions giving the scope and
objectives of the program; (b) Actively
participate as often as possible; (c)
Participate as guest speakers, lending
their experience and knowledge to stimu-
late discussion; and (d) Encourage active
participation in the leadership program
through seminars for officers and staff
noncommissioned officers under their
command." [Ref. 53, p. 5]
The leadership training program is an on-going effort
designed to permeate all levels of the Marine Corps.
Internal Marine Corps correspondance held by the author
provides observations and data indicating some of the pro-
gram's successes: (1) A one-third decrease in significant
racial incidents throughout the Marine Corps in 1976 as
compared to 1975; (2) A significant decrease in equal
opportunity/race relations complaints by individuals;
(3) A continuous improvement in the racial and equal oppor-
tunity climate reported by the Commandant's Equal Opportunity
Consultants after their field trips to Marine Corps commands
world-wide; (4) A marked decrease in Congressional interest
letters alleging racial, ethnic, and sex discrimination;
(5) Reports from field commanders citing leadership training
as the reason for fewer equal opportunity complaints, reduced
racial/ethnic discord, and an increase in comradeship among
all Marines; (6) The observable increase in social inter-
action among all Marines during off-duty hours, on and off
base; and (7) , The enthusiastic endorsement of the marine
program as a better solution to eliminate racial discord
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and promote better understanding by other service officers
attending Marine Corps 1 schools.
Yet, notwithstanding these optimistic observations,
the Marine Corps continues to experience significant problems
that threaten Its, mission effectiveness. Alcohol abuse
among Marines continues to result in many lost manhours.
[Ref. 19, p. 54] Unacceptably high rates of desertion,
unauthorized absence, and disciplinary infractions continue
to plague the Marine Corps. As one Marine officer noted
in the Marine Corps Gazette :
"The Marine Corps' rate of unauthorized
absence per 1000 men has been at least three
times higher than the other uniformed ser-
vices; in addition, we have almost four
times the number of desertions and more
than three times as many courtmartials
than do the other services." [Ref. 37, p. 30]
Disappointing re-enlistment rates erode experienced manpower
and result in increased retraining costs. Serious (although
isolated) racial confrontations like the Klu Klux Klan inci-
dent at Camp Pendleton and negative incidents like the death
of Private McClure at San Diego have been fanned to inflamma-
tory degrees by a sensationalism-seeking press. [Ref. 66,
pp. 23-32] These realities erode the image of the Marine
Corps and increase its vulnerability in the ultra-complex
socio-political arena of Washington, D.C. As Wright (1975)
notes
:
"It is a fact of military life that in
eras of scarce dollars any excuse or
rationale for not giving a service money
suffices. Whether that excuse consists of
a race riot, an unwitting training accident
or a hassle over female participation is
irrelevant. The reality persists." [Ref. 86, p. 11]
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Although the current leadership training program
contributed to the reduction of highly visible personnel
disturbances, image-embarrassing problems still exist.
Perhaps this is because the enthusiasm for the leadership
training program manifested at Headquarters is not equally
shared at many field commands. Regardless of what is done
at the macro-level (staff) , if failure of execution occurs
at the micro-level (unit) , the leadership training program
will be severely retarded as to its effectiveness. If the
officers and NCOs charged with the field implementation of
the program look upon it as "another routine training commit-
ment imposed from the top" or unenthusiastically engage in
it because "orders are orders", the dynamic thrust of the
program will in a great degree of probability be dissipated.
In what may be indicative of a sizeable number of opinions,
Marine Corps officers have expressed dissatisfaction and
hesitation in unofficial commentaries to professional publica-
tions :
"The program falls short of its motivating
ideal and stated purpose. . .once again an
expensive, time consuming program has been
foisted upon us which fails to provide any
basis for dealing with those real leadership
problems casually cast aside as 'surface
issues '... the lack of relativity to the so-
called 'surface issues' is a major problem
to anyone participating in leadership
training. .. the manuals guide discussions away
from specific, real-life issues .. .discussion
leaders are not assigned their leadership
training duties on a primary basis. Nor are
they entirely, if in the least, qualified to
conduct reliable or meaningful 'pulse-taxing
studies' — even if their primary duties
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permitted the time to attempt such studies . .
.
what is needed, though, is a substantive
program which focuses on the realities of
local, immediate problems..." [Ref. 59, pp. 22-23]
"...we've been sold a bill of goods. From
somewhere a gaggle of social scientists have
come out of the woodwork to tell us they've
discovered something new called leadership.
It has to do with such things as cultural
shock, dual life value, ethnic heritage and
the mating habits of the lesser apes. Its
practice is cloaked in quasi-religious
mysticism requiring group therapy sessions
that verge on self-flagellation and proper
SRB/OQR entries to ensure that the great
paper shuffler in the sky will look down on
us and smile... I don't care a rodent's rump
for the whole wishy-washy, civilian, human
relations approach you're selling. .. seems
like there's a lot of change just for the
sake of change these days..." [Ref. 10, pp. 21-22]
Professor C.A. Wright in critiquing a consultation trip
to the Leadership Training School at Quantico expresses both
optimism and concern for the present program. He writes
that a major strength lies in the professional commitment of
senior Marine Corps leaders and their staffs:
"The General Officers and Senior Colonels
with whom I talked at Headquarters left me
pleasantly surprised. I found no dated
'Apostles of Yesteryear' that would tend to
retard the updating of the Corps ' Human
Resource Management effort and the subsequent
removal of the Marine Corps' vulnerability in
the critical areas tending to damage the Corps
'
image... I found (them) very cognizant of the
Marine Corps' current problems and was
especially impressed by their insights into
the problems of the minorities and young
people who form today's personnel pool...
I found genuine healthy curiosity at the top
whose energy was aimed at ways to tap personnel
commitment, loyalty, and ways to motivate the
problematic group..." [Ref. 43, p. 1]
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Yet, Professor Wright also expresses concern for possible
weaknesses that might handicap the program:
"If any one observation during the trip to
Marine Corps Headquarters disturbed me it was
the trip to Quantico. It drove home to me
how extremely difficult the job involved in
translating to various levels of subordinate
commands what the positive attitudes toward
HRM held by top echelon staff might be."
[Ref. 85, p. 16]
Moreover, Professor Wright notes that HRM instructors: tend
to incorrectly perceive a lack of support and appreciation
by higher headquarters; maintain a subtle but tenacious
tendency to continue old methods of instruction due to caution
and possibly real fear; and possibly lack knowledge as to the
importance of small group dynamics as a tool for experiential
learning. [Ref. 85, p. 16]
Since the leadership training program centers on the
process of guided discussion, it is critical that the discus-
sion leaders be of top quality and confident of support by
superiors. The discussion leaders must operate in an arena
where the most painful and emotion laden issues of American
life are discussed, debated, and often stripped to their bare
bones. If doubts exist as to the quality and continuing
commitment of instructors at Quantico (geographically
contiguent and in close communication with Headquarters)
these doubts may be compounded regarding discussion leaders
at more isolated and removed field units.
Given the probable validity of Professor Wright's critique
and in view of possible wide-spread dissatisfaction as
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suggested by unofficial commentaries, how can the present
leadership training program be altered to increase its
effectiveness in combatting the problems that continue to
threaten the Marine Corps 1 image? It is suggested by this
author that the behavioral science techniques of Organization
Development — if specifically tailored to the uniqueness of
the Marine Corps — can be incorporated into the leadership
training program to improve its problem resolving abilities.
Moreover, this author proposes that if Organization Develop-
ment is judiciously employed in the leadership training
program, senior commanders may enjoy a proactive stance
towards impending incidents inimical to the Marine Corps and
thereby engage in incident prevention vice incident reaction.
Minus more trust between juniors and seniors, minority and
majority group personnel, the Marine Corps will probably
remain in a vulnerable reactive posture. Although Commanding
Officers and their senior staffs possess the requisite power
and authority to issue appropriate orders for preventing
negative incidents, these personnel will probably remain the
last to be informed of impending trouble. Without proper_
lead time to issue orders necessary to set in motion counter-
vailing mechanisms aimed at preventing dysfunctional
incidents, senior commanders can only react after the fact
and thus remain sources of Corps' vulnerability. However,
Organization Development techniques may prove to be an
effective "sounding board" whereby unit leaders can feel the
36

true "pulse" of their organizations which beats immediately
below the official surface. Such awareness can facilitate
commanders in tapping the sources of organizational "vitality"




CONCEPTS, GOALS, AND TECHNIQUES
To analyze the possible utilization of Organization
Development (OD) techniques in the Marine Corps' leadership
training program it is first necessary to discuss the major
concepts and principles of OD as espoused by leading practi-
tioners and theorists. What is meant by OD? What does it
attempt to do?
French and Bell , who have written what is perhaps "the
primer" for this emergent field, concisely define OD as:
"...(an) applied behavioral science discipline
that seeks to improve organizations through
planned, systematic, long-range efforts
focused on the organization's culture and its
human and social processes. The goals of
organization development are to make the
organization more effective, more viable, and
better able to achieve the goals of the
organization as an entity and the goals of
the individuals within the organization..."
[Ref. 26, p. xiv]
Although their semantics differ, the spirit of this
definition is commonly shared by noted authorities such as
Argyris (1971), Beckhard (1969), Bennis (1969), Golembiewski
(1970), and 3urke (1972). While various scholars advocate
different models and technologies in the employment of OD,
it is basically agreed upon by all that the OD process is
long-range, system-wide, and on-going. It is a survey
data-based approach to planned change and focuses on the
work group. OD practitioners emphasize the collaborative
management of the organization's culture and eschew the
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fallacy that either the organization or the individual must
be deprived of its objectives for the service of the other.
Moreover, OD scholars typically advocate the use of an
external consultant who intervenes into the informal structure
given the mandate of the formal organization. Since each of
these concepts is central to the OD philosophy, the following
discussions are in order.
Although it is deeply rooted in the behavioral sciences
,
OD has not directly evolved out of behavioral science theory
but has developed primarily as a response to the growing
requirements for change in our times. [Ref. 36, Ch. 1] The
focus of OD is usually on change and is directed towards
improving organizational effectiveness. In addition to
learning new ways of dealing with complex organizational
relationships, OD assists an organization to view change as
a natural process instead of a special or disturbing phenomenon
OD emphasizes that the process of planned change can be incor-
porated into the many other processes of organizational life
for the mutual benefit of the organization and its personnel.
OD practitioners believe that organization development offers
today's best answer to the interdependent problems of
improving organization efficiency and enhancing individual
worth.
The credos and philosophies of OD are significantly
different from the traditionalist school of organizational
design. The traditionalists equated organizational health
to technical competence. Through the principles of scientific
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management, the traditionalists sought to integrate personnel
with their respective assignments by careful job design often
based on time and motion studies and objective measurements.
[Ref. 75, vol. 3] The emphasis was on making a man the
extension of his machine through careful hiring practices,
job-related instruction, and judicious dismissals for
incompetence. Personal emotions were discounted. The
preferred organizational structure was generally the Weberian
hierarchy. [Ref. 80, Ch. 1-3] Organization conflict was
viewed as an anathema and indicative of a "sick" organization.
In their abhorrence of organizational conflict, rejection
of collaborative management, and dismissal of the personal
aspirations of subordinate personnel, the traditionalists
stand in direct opposition to the tenets of modern OD.
The behavioralist school of organization theory comes
closer to the beliefs of OD by recognizing that conflict is
part of the reality of modern, complex organizations. Indeed,
the behavioralists felt, conflict is perhaps good for an
organization as reflective of organizational vitality.
[Ref. 41, Ch. 9] Gardner (1969) suggests that the absence
of conflict leads to organizational entropy in which an
organization deteriorates and develops what he calls "dry
rot". [Ref. 29, Ch. 3] Eventually this malignancy spreads
throughout the entire system. Workers begin to produce




The behavioralists built upon the pioneer works of Follett
(1940) who stressed the importance of recognizing the personal
aspirations of subordinates. [Ref. 23, Ch. 1-6] The behavior-
alists increasingly sought to develop responsivenss to the
social and egotistical needs of workers in order to enhance
member cooperativeness with technical requirements. They
subscribed to the theories of Maslow (19 54) who stated that
motivation was a function of satisfying an ascending hierarchy
of needs [Ref. 57, Ch. 2-5]. Consequently, the behavioralists
argued, worker productivity would not be maximized by rele-
gating workers to mere extensions of their assignments.
Leaders had to be cognizant of personal, internal needs which
were not associated with the physical mechanics of a job.
However, as Wright (1975) notes, the behavioralist approach
to organizational improvement was frequently unproductive
since it often stopped abruptly with the mere recognition of
conflict and the importance of the individual. [Ref. 86, p. 42]
Constructive conflict resolutions were infrequently offered.
The human relations approach to organizational improvement
shares many of the concepts found in earlier OD efforts.
Indeed, this author believes that early OD practices can be
criticized as being little more than "advanced human
relations." Ganesh (1971) describes the characteristics of
a human relations orientation:
"The consultant considers organizational
development as a change effort involving
small system-like groups and accordingly
focuses more on the implications of the
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work for the group and less on implications
for the rest of the organization.
The consultant works as an involved
helper, as if he were another member of the
organization.
The consultant relates as a person to
individuals and to small groups as client
systems
.
Involvement is short term and of a
specific type as, for instance, in T-groups
and sensitivity training.
The consultant is people oriented rather
than task oriented, and, accordingly, there
is a tendency to work on changes involving
interpersonal relationships." [Ref. 28, p. 50]
Current OD practices go well beyond the human relations
approach in scope (focusing on the entire socio-technical
system rather than on limited aspects of one or the other)
,
sophistication (rejecting simplistic notions of the :,one
best way" and "happiness leads to performance"), and in its
prime change mechanism (development occurs as members learn
experientially rather than by following the dictums of staff
consultants or personnel specialists). Moreover, unlike
advocates of other schools of organizational improvement,
the OD practitioner: does not study an organization's life
at one particular point and base future policies upon
conclusions derived from this one point in time (rather,
OD is on-going and interactive) ; does not restrict inter-
vention to the top strata of management (instead, OD inter-
venes at all levels of the organization's strata inboth the
formal and informal spheres); does not make recommendations
and render expert advice (rather, OD makes the organization
define its own problems and render solutions); and does not
produce elaborate reports as end products, in themselves




OD approaches effectiveness from a systems point of view.
It imagines an organization as a system composed of and
dependent upon three major elements or subsystems: (1) the
task system, or technical system, which includes the flow of
work, the required task roles, and the technology involved;
(2) the administrative, or managerial system, which includes
the organization's structure, policies, personnel selection
and evaluation, rules, rewards and punishments, and the ways
in which decisions get made; and (3) the human, or personal-
cultural system, which involves organization culture, norms,
values, and beliefs. The human system also includes the
informal organization, the motivational level of members,
and individual attitudes. Since it is the interaction of
these three systems that produces the behavior and role
relationships that affect organizational output, planned
organizational change must consider the potential impact on
all elements of the system when one of its subsystems is
changed. [Ref. 46, pp. 1144-1170]
The initial vehicles for OD intervention tend to be
the human and administrative subsystems, that is, the
communications and feedback systems plus the attitude and
sentiment components of the informal system. [Ref. 26, p. 83]
However, these in turn, become vehicles for confronting any
problems in the technological subsystem due to the inter-
dependent nature of the three components. For example, the
moment that subordinate military personnel start understanding
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and internalizing the norms under which they have been
operating, their communications and probably their decision
making will be affected. When a military superior begins
to listen to and understand feelings, the authority structure
begins to subtly change. Reciprocally, the outcome of a
leader altering his communication style to a more inquiring
and understanding-seeking stance is likely to be a positive
shift in subordinate feelings. The subordinates are probably
more likely to be tied to their leader through bonds of
loyalty, trust, and interdependence than through strict,
impersonal role requirements.
By intervening in the subsystems of an organization, OD
attempts to improve the organization's problem-solving
processes. French and Bell (1973) define problem-solving as
"the way in which an organization goes about diagnosing and
making decisions about the opportunities and challenges of
its environment." [Ref. 26, p. 15] For instance, does an
organization (e.g., the Marine Corps) solve problems in such
a way that it utilizes the creativity and commitment of a
select few, or does it tap deeply into the resources, vitality,
and common purposes of all organizational members? Does it
see its environment and mission in terms of ten years ago,
or is it continually redefining its purposes and methods
in terms of the present and the future? OD aims at
developing the entirety of an organization's internal
resources to resolve problems more effectively.
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While OD attempts to improve problem-solving processes,
it also focuses on the closely associated concept of improving
organization renewal. Lippitt (1958) defines organization
renewal as "the process of initiating, creating, and con-
fronting needed changes so as to make it possible for organ-
izations to become or remain viable, to adapt to new condi-
tions, to solve problems, and to learn from experiences."
[Ref. 49, p. 1] Argyris (1971) stresses organization renewal
in his description of OD: "At the heart of organization
development is the concern for the vitalization , energizing,
actualizing, activating, and renewing of organizations
through technical and human resources." [Ref. 3, p. ix]
Similarly, Gardner (1965) in writing about organizational
self-renewal refers to: the regaining of vitality, creativity,
and innovation; the furtherance of flexibility and adapta-
bility; and "the process of bringing results of change
into line with purposes." [Ref. 30, pp. 1-7] These concerns
with improving the problem-solving and renewal processes
of organizations are central to the theories of many OD
practitioners
.
For an OD effort to be effective it must be "bought into"
by organization leaders and receive its mandate from the
formal system. [Refs. 73, p. 231; 13, pp. 29-42] However,
it is necessary that an OD intervention be simultaneously
accepted by the informal organization. Traditionally,
this "hidden" domain was either not examined at all or only
partially examined. OD not only recognizes the informal
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system but also stresses that OD success depends upon the
degree to which the prevailing culture of the informal
organization can be positively managed to support the aims
of the formal organization. Although Krueber and Kluckhohn
(1952) cite 164 definitions of culture, it essentially
means the prevailing patterns of beliefs, values, attitudes,
norms, and interactions found within an organization.
[Ref. 44, p. 291-357] Culture includes Argyris ' definition
of a "living system": "The way people actually behave, the
way they actually think and feel, the way they actually deal
with each other." [Ref. 4, p. 2] The culture of the infor-
mal organization is a powerful determinant of the formal
organization's effectiveness. Its stated mission and desired
direction of movement can be severely jeopardized if the
culture of the informal organization is not supportive. In
recognition of this reality, once an OD program is legiti-
mated by the formal organization, the initial intervention
strategy is usually through the informal system since atti-
tudes and feelings are usually the first data to be confronted
OD stresses that organizational effectiveness is maximized
when the officially-stated goals of the formal organization
are supported by the culture of the informal organization.
OD practitioners advocate that the culture and beliefs of
the general organization should be "owned" as much by the
subordinates as by the formal leader. OD efforts attempt
to foster collaborative management of the culture - not a
hierarchically imposed kind. OD theorists hold that an
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organization based on shared management of its culture and
goals will tend to be a dynamic, vital organization.
[Ref. 7, pp. 3-25]
Implicit in this belief about the desirability of shared
management, are the basic assumptions about people. One
has to do with personal growth and the other concerns con-
structive contributions. These philosophies of many prominent
OD practitioners are, in general, congruent with the theories
of McGregor (1967) , Likert (1967) , Argyris (1964) , Schein
(1965), and Herzberg (1966). [Refs. 58, Ch. 1-5; 48, Ch. 1-3;
2, Ch. 2; 69, Ch. 1-6; 35, Ch. 1-3] The first assumption
about people is that most individuals have drives toward
personal growth and development if provided with an envir-
onment that is both supportive and challenging. Most people
want to become more of what they are capable of becoming.
The second assumption, related to the first, is that most
people desire to make, and are capable of making, a higher
level of contribution to the attainment of organizational
goals than most organizational environments will permit.
A tremendous amount of constructive energy can probably be
tapped if organizations recognize this. Lewin (1951) and
his students produced research to show that active partici-
pation may lead to more productivity, greater commitment,
and greater personal satisfaction. Moreover, Lewin and
his students went further to show that participation by
subordinates is worthwhile because people may have important
contributions to make. [Ref. 47, Ch. 3] Indeed, they
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questioned the genuineness of participation if subordinates
were not making significant contributions. Frequently,
however, organizational members learn that what they per-
ceive to be constructive efforts may be self-defeating in the
sense that these efforts are not rewarded and may be pena-
lized. For example, attempts at lateral communications
between two battalions to solve some problems may be met
with resistance because of differing interpretations about
the chain of command.
These assumptions about people and about contributions
differ markedly from more traditional views about people.
As Tannenbaum and Davis (1969) state it:
"The traditional view of individuals is
that they can be defined in terms of
given interests, knowledge, skills and
personality characteristics: they can
gain new knowledge, acquire additional
skills, and even at times change their
interests, but it is rare that people
really change. This view, when buttressed
by related organizational attitudes and
modes , insures a relative fixity of
individuals, with crippling effects."
[Ref. 74, pp. 68-70]
Therefore, one can view people as either fixed entities or
as "in process" of becoming. The latter assumption under-
lies many OD interventions - many of which are aimed at
unleashing personal growth and contribution or are designed
to modify organizational constraints that are having a
dampening or throttling effect. The desired result of
these OD efforts is to foster organization growth through
the growth of its constituent personnel.
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Since OD is a process for improving organizational
effectiveness, this implies doing things differently and
better, which in turn means changing some features of the
organization (usually its processes and culture) . OD rests
on a particular strategy of change that has implications
for practitioners and organization members alike. Chin
and Benne (1969) describe three types of strategies for
change: 1) The empirical-rational strategies based on the
assumptions that men are rational, will follow their rational
self-interests, and will change if and when they come to
realize that change is advantageous to them; 2) The power-
coercive strategies based on the idea that change is com-
pliance of those with less power to those with more power;
and 3) , The normative-re-educative strategies based on the
assumptions that norms form the basis for behavior and
change comes through a re-educative process in which old
norms are discarded and supplanted by new ones. [Ref. 16,
pp. 32-59]
Of these various .strategies for organizational change,
French and Bell (1973) state that most OD efforts are pri-
marily based on a normative-re-educative approach and secondly
on a rational-empirical one. [Ref. 26, pp. 50-54] Burke and
Nornstein (1971) and Bennis (1969) support this contention.
[Refs. 26, p. 53; 9, p. 15] Focusing on this normative-
re-educative strategy for change, as practiced in an OD
program, the following implications exist: The client organ-
ization defines what changes and improvements it wants to
49

make, rather than the change agent; the change agent
attempts to intervene in a mutual collaborative way with
the client as together they define problems and seek solu-
tions; doubts, anxieties, and negative feelings that hinder
effective problem-solving are surfaced and publically
examined; the methods and knowledge of the behavioral
sciences are used as resources by both the change agent and
the client; and the solutions to the problems are not assigned
to factors external to the organization but are assumed
to probably reside in values, relationships, and customary
ways of doing things. [Ref. 26, p. 53]
The concept of the utilization of a change agent or
catalyst is another distinguishing feature of OD. In the
early phases, at least, the services of a third party who
is not an integral part of the prevailing organization is
essential. Although this third party may be a member of
the larger organization, he sould be external to the par-
ticular subsystem that is initiating an OD effort. As
French and Bell (1973) clearly state: "We are somewhat
pessimistic about the optimal effectiveness of OD efforts
that are do-it-yourself programs." [Ref. 26, pp. 17-13]
Additionally, Steiner and Miner (1977) discuss the merits
of external change agents vice internal change agents from
economic grounds by noting that external agents are preferable
due to the expenses and resources necessary to maintain a
permanent internal staff. An opposite position is held by
Margolies and Wallace (1972) and Scurrah, Shani and Zipfel
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(1971) who suggest the use of internal change agents
because of the advantages of detailed knowledge of the
organization and the people in it. [Refs. 52, Ch. 3; 70,
Ch. 5] However, the totality of OD practitioners do agree
that the operating base of the change agent must free him
from the obligation to support particular power groups in
the organization.
The change agent frequently concentrates on the ongoing
work group as the key element in an OD effort. The work
group includes both subordinates and superiors. [Ref. 26,
p. 17] OD attempts to encourage team building within the
work group to decrease dysfunctional competition and increase
collaboration within the work group and between interacting
groups. OD strives to perfect teamwork in an organization
through analysis of team culture and by developing team
skills in planning, setting objectives, and problem solving.
The goal of these activities is to increase communications
and interactions between work-related groups and to replace
an "us and them" point of view with an awareness of the
necessity for interdependence of action calling on the best
efforts of all groups. Fordyce and Weil (1971) and Blake
et al (1965) note that a significant amount of dysfunctional
energy is often spent in competition, misunderstanding,
miscommunication, and misperception between related groups.
Organizational reward structures frequently encourage such
behavior through emphasis on unit goal attainment as con-
trasted with total-organization goal attainment. [Refs. 25,
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pp. 124-130; 12, Ch. 1] For example, it is probable that
many Battalion Commanders may tend to measure their success
on the degree that their individual battalions are combat
ready - instead of on the overall effectiveness of the
regiment of which they are integral parts. Organization
development methods attempt to overcome such parochial
syndromes by providing ways of increasing intergroup coop-
eration and communication.
OD attempts to improve organizational effectiveness
through the positive management of group culture which will
hopefully result in increased cooperation and communication.
In this pursuit, OD practitioners generally employ contingency
theories. Although the phrase "contingency theory of organ-
izations" was first utilized by Lawrence and Lorsh (1967),
the ideas underlying the concept have been supported by many
other researchers and observers such as Chandler (1962),
Woodward (1965) , Thompson (1967) , Cannon (1972) , Clifford
(1973), Perrow (1973), and Lorsh and Morse (1974). This
concept basically asserts that there is no one "right" or
"best" way to organize for effective results. The particular
method employed to increase organizational effectiveness
depends upon the structure, maturity, goals, and culture
of the individual organization. [Refs. 45, Ch. 1; 15,
Ch. 1-3; 34, Ch. 1-6; 77, Ch. 3; 14, Ch. 1; 18, Ch. 4;
65, pp. 380-441; 50, Ch. 1-2] In recognition of this con-
tingency theory, OD practitioners may utilize a wide range
of major types or "families" of OD interventions depending
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upon the nature of the client organization and the skills
of the involved practitioner. French and Bell (1973)
list twelve major types of OD interventions and the activi-
ties associated with them. [Ref. 26, pp. 102-104] Utilization
of a particular type depends upon whether the OD intervention
is problem-specific, process-specific, or program-specific.
[Ref. 26, pp. 105-106]
Although OD interventions vary due to the contingencies
associated with individual organizations, there is a basic
intervention model which runs through the majority of OD
efforts. This is the action research model. Basically,
the action research model consists of (1) a preliminary
diagnosis, (2) data gathering from the client organization,
(3) data feedback to the client organization, (4) data
exploration by the client organization, (5) action planning
based on the data explored and, (6.1 action. This sequence
tends to be cyclical and focuses on new or advanced problems
as the client group learns to work more effectively together.
[Ref. 26, p. 84] Shepard (1960), Beckhard (1960), and
Havelock (19 69) emphasize the importance of action research
in any attempts to improve organization effectiveness. They
conclude that its validity lies in the application of the
scientific method of fact-finding and experimentation to
practical problems requiring action solutions. [Refs. 72,
pp. 33-34; 8, p. 28; 33, pp. 5-33] The scientific method
of data base collection is an orderly process of inquiry and
hypotheses testing. It is systematic and methodical. Hence,
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OD interventions based on action research are not erratic,
random, and capricious. The scientific method inherent in
action research lends great strength to OD interventions.
Indeed, French and Bell (1973) emphasize the importance of
action research by stating: "...Because of the extensive
applicability of this model to organization development,
another definition of organization development could be
organization improvement through action research." [Ref. 26,
p. 18]
Successful organization development tends to be a total
system effort, a process of planned improvement through
constructive management of change. It is aimed at developing
the organization's internal resources for effective change
in the future. Its real thrusts are for organizational
members to draw out and help develop the resources of each
other. Furthermore, it is a collaborative process of
managing the culture of the organization - not something
that is done to somebody, but a transactional process of
people working together to improve their mutual effective-
ness in attaining their mutual objectives. In this sense,
OD is much supportive of the Marine Corps slogan "gung ho"
(i*e. , working together).
Although OD asserts that to develop or improve an
organization is to change it, it does recognize that stability
and relative permanence have worth in organizations too.
Organization development means examining organizational
culture and keeping the good things, modifying some, and
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eliminating others. If OD were incorporated into the
Marine Corps' leadership training program, it would not
represent a cutting loose from tested values and assumptions.
However, it would involve a searching look to see which
practices and norms are functional and which are not. OD
would retain the many features of the Marine Corps which
have contributed to its growth, relevance, adaptiveness
,
and responsiveness. Yet, through investigation and manage-
ment of Marine Corps' culture, it would eliminate those
dysfunctional features which are associated with its
present problems and represent sources of vulnerability.
Although other branches of the Armed Forces have utilized
various tenets of OD to manage their large, complex struc-
tures (particularly the U.S. Navy which funded pioneer OD
research in 1947 and currently employs OD techniques in its
HRM programs) , the Marine Corps has yet to tap the benefits
of OD technology. As will be later investigated, many
internal factors exist which may perhaps inhibit an active
participation in OD programs. However, it is the opinion
of this author that if these forces were to be overcome or
modified, a carefully tailored OD program developed by
people who thoroughly understand the unique needs of the




V. INTERNAL MARINE CORPS FACTORS INFLUENCING
THE INTRODUCTION OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
The germination of any seed into fruition is dependent
upon the chemical and biological conditions of the surrounding
soil into which it is implanted. Unless provisions exist
for adjusting unfavorable balances in acidity or alkalinity,
the maturity and growth of the seed will be handicapped.
Similarly, the salient features of the institutional climate
existing in the Marine Corps must likewise be considered
in discussing the feasibility of incorporating organization
development techniques into Marine Corps HRM programs. Is
the structure and internal culture of the Marine Corps
supportive to the introduction of OD? Can OD be grafted
onto the existing leadership training program to produce a
hybrid program yielding increased fruits in the maximization
of manpower potential? What are the forces and attitudes
whose presence deters the successful introduction of OD into
the Marine Corps? Likewise, in what areas does the Marine
Corps represent 'fertile ground" for the implanting of OD
concepts?
In addressing the primary features of the Marine Corps
climate which both foster and deter the introduction of OD
efforts, this author is forced to adopt a stance primarily
based on personal observation and insight, discussions with
serving Marine Corps officers and parties interested in
Marine affairs, and informal commentaries. Analysis must
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rely on such a non-quantitative, subjective base since
existing literature and previous analyses reveal a dearth
of documented information regarding the "goodness of fit"
between OD and the Marine Corps. Essentially, no previous
studies appear to exist which specifically examine the
compatability of OD concepts vis-a-vis internal Marine Corps
forces. With this restriction in mind, this author proposes
the following:
A. Forces which may facilitate the introduction of OD:
1) Senior Marine Corps leadership - Successful OD
efforts necessitate a formal mandate by top leadership.
Senior members of an organization's heirarchy must "buy in".
Wright (1975) reports experiences which indicate that senior
Marine Corps leaders charged with developing effective HRM
programs possess "healthy curiosity" for innovative ways to
tap personnel commitment. Although they are realist and
pragmatically interested in combat effectiveness they
appear not to be encumbered by a "longing for the good old
days" but realize a need to update the leadership techniques
of unit level officers and NCOs. [Ref. 85, p. 1] The
successful introduction of OD efforts greatly depend upon the
professional support of such senior officers. The incorpor-
ation of OD into existing Marine Corps HRM programs would
be greatly facilitated if such senior leaders - on the basis
of much study and professional reflection - become convinced
that OD represents a means of maximizing Marine Corps'
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manpower potential while concomitantly reducing sources of
Marine Corps vulnerability. Indeed, without the support
of innovative leaders who are concerned with the organiza-
tion's renewed vitality, successful OD programs are not
feasible.
2) The Size of the Marine Corps - The Marine Corps is
the smallest military component of the Department of Defense.
[Ref. 20, p. 4] It consumes fewer material resources and
utilizes less manpower than its sister services. In con-
trast to the other services, the Marine Corps requires
fewer supporting elements to facilitate its primary mission.
While the other services often appear to possess commands
whose existence have only the remotest connection to the
fundamental missions of sea control, air superiority, or
prosecution of land warfare, the supporting elements in the
Marine Corps are usually more directly related to its primary
mission. Hence, the Marine Corps has been less forced to
erect the complicated chains of command and complex communi-
cation channels necessary to integrate and coordinate widely
diversed and dissimilar elements. Essentially, a sense of
teamwork and common mission seems more prevalent in the
Marine Corps than perhaps in the other services. Moreover,
because of the small size and flexibility of the Marine
Corps, Marine Corps personnel of any one occupational
specialty (correspondence clerks, for example) are more
likely to find themselves involved in direct combat than
their counterparts in associated services. The size of the
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Corps and the generally-recognized commonality of purpose
among Marines (i.e., riflemen) assist the introduction of
OD efforts by providing an arena of shared identity. Since
Marines, regardless of particular job assignment, are
perhaps more prone to share similar expectations about
their fundamental military mission (i.e., combat), OD
interventions may generate more immediate results than
among military personnel possessing more diverse and
alienated senses of identity and expectation.
3) Emphasis on Leadership - The Marine Corps has con-
tinually stressed that all personnel in positions of responsi-
bility (both officer and NCO) command through sound leader-
ship techniques in addition to the titular authority invested
in their rank. A primary characteristic of effective leader-
ship is the ability to "know your men". By understanding
the needs, professional potential, and sources of friction
existing among subordinate personnel, a military leader is
able to engage in appropriate actions which can greatly
enhance performance of mission. Moreover, whenever subordin-
ates realize that their leader is truly interested in their
aspirations and personal potentials, it is reasonable to
assume that they will be tied to the leader by strengthened
bonds of loyalty, trust, and respect. In the climate of
the mid-70s, motivation of subordinates is perhaps increasingly
dependent on a leader's ability to "know his men" in order
to overcome and dissuade the apparent scepticism and distrust
that many young enlistees may possess towards figures of
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authority. As compared to other managerial techniques,
OD is especially supportive of a leader's need to "know his
men". Indeed, OD may possibly be the best management tool
for enabling a superior to know and understand his subordin-
ates. In its insistance on effective leadership (vice
strict reliance on authoritarian dictates as a function of
rank) the Marine Corps represents "fertile ground" for the
introduction of OD efforts especially tailored and structured
for the particular needs of the Corps.
4) The Need to Reduce Dysfunctional Phenomena - The
Marine Corps is currently experiencing personnel unrest
that increases its vulnerability by eroding its existing
assets and marring its image in the complex socio-political
arena of Congress. Top leaders must divert critical time
and energy in reacting to problematic events and in explaining
the Marine Corps' position. As was discussed earlier, the
symptoms of this personnel unrest are manifested in low
retention rates, high degrees of disciplinary infractions,
and negative (although isolated) racial and training inci-
dents that are made "newsworthy" by a sensationalism-hungry
press. The current leadership training program required of
all marines is a main attempt to stem and alleviate dys-
functional occurances. However, it appears that the conduct
and focus of the leadership training program may not be
sufficient to overcome the several sources of Marine Corps
vulnerability. Although the present program is a sincere
effort to address the causes of personnel unrest, it may
60

not be sufficient - especially in the vital area of providing
the local commander with "inside" information concerning
potential or impending conflict situations. Without this
advanced insight, the commander is forced to react ex post
facto and is handicapped in instituting pertinent proactive
measures to "defuse" the situation. OD, however, attempts
to open the channels of communication. It allows informa-
tion to flow both "upwards" and "down". Hence, if certain
aspects of OD were carefully incorporated into the existing
leadership training program, the commander would possess a
vehicle by which he could positively manage, direct, and
preempt festering sources of strife. The leadership training
program could possibly be strengthen and made more effective
by the dovetailing of selective OD techniques.
B. Forces Which May Deter The Introduction of OD
:
1) Tendency to adhere to traditional leadership -
The Marine Corps is, above all, a combat organization.
Combat success is usually dependent upon strict obedience
and firm compliance to the orders of field commanders.
Furthermore, the increasing complexity of modern combat
demands tight coordination between associated fighting
elements. The documented history of Marine Corps campaigns
reveals that combat success has been facilitated by strict
obedience to the dictates of superiors. In the "heat of
combat" , a fighting man must be willing to lay down his
life if the success of his unit's mission so demands. Under
these conditions, traditional leadership has usually proven
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effective. Consequently, Marine Corps leaders are reluctant
to depart from such time-tested leadership styles. Moreover,
combat success is enhanced by stressful, realistic training
which also incorporates traditional leadership.
This belief in the "bottom-line" effectiveness of tra-
ditional leadership appears to not only determine the actual
conduct of combat but also colors the planning of combat
operations. Because a leader must live with his decisions,
combat planning is frequently restricted to his own professional
expertise and the input of his staff officers. This is
quite often the case regardless of obvious dysfunctions
associated with it: Superiors plan while subordinates
execute. Although Marine Corps history reveals organizations
like Carlson's Raiders who actively sought wide-spread
input from subordinates in collaborative pre-combat planning,
such fighting units were unique: they were not specifically
fixed in organization structure and material assets; they
tailored their resources to each individual operation; and
they disbanded their men/material mix upon completion of
the operation. The organizational flexibility of Carlson's
Raiders allowed them to practice project management with a
high degree of success. Yet, there were attendent complaints
that Carlson's Raiders stripped associated units of their
best leaders. The majority of today's Marine units are so
constructed as to disallow such free and random interchange
of personnel talents and material assets. Although supporting
and augmenting resources are exchanged between units according
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to particular missions, the high degree to which Carlson's
Raiders interchanged specific assets is lacking.
The preference for traditional leadership which
seems to exist in the Marine Corps is perhaps based on a
desire to maintain tightness of control. Unit leaders
appear to feel anxiety that more collaborative methods will
somehow undermine their position and loosen their grip on
unit operations. Since leaders are held accountable for
the success of their organizations, they frequently tend to
consider their units "my" battalion, "my" company, etc.
and consequently fear leadership methods which they per-
ceive as threatening to their personal control. Moreover,
the syndrome appears to exist (especially among less
experienced officers) that a military officer is a "leader"
and not a "manage"; a "leader" makes decisions while a
"manager" places his imprimatur on group decisions made for
him. Although this perception is erroneous, the syndrome
that a leader personally controls and solely directs does
appear to exist. Consequently, leaders are often hesitant
to solicit unit-wide input for fear of arousing suspicions
of "uncertainty", "weakness", and lack of "professional
knowledge".
There appears to be a tendency for traditional
leadership to deteriorate into authoritarian leadership.
The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps has commented:
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"There is a contagious disease evident
within our ranks that has infected some of
our leaders, both officer and enlisted. It
needs curing. I call it, "DI Syndrome."
Some of the symptoms are:
The exclusive use of authoritarian leader-
ship techniques by an officer, staff NCO
or NCO to accomplish tasks assigned. If
questioned by a subordinate why a task has
to be accomplished, they answer, 'Because I
say so,
' and point to their rank insignia.
Giving subordinates the impression that
the superior is a mean person, not to be
bothered with petty problems.
The use of ridicule to correct subordinates
for their mistakes.
The use of mass punishment for the mistakes
of a few. " [Ref . 38, p. 14]
The Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps goes on to point
out that while some effective leaders can use authoritarian
methods, they are rare. Rather, authoritarian leadership
generally leads to "a loss of respect and alienation of
subordinates." [Ref. 38, p. 14] Espirit d' corps is undermined
He continues by stating:
"Authoritarian leaders are not certain of
the degree of control they will be able to
retain over subordinates, if they release
any control in the decision making process
to subordinates. Their security is threatened.
They must retain control for themselves.
Persuasive leaders, on the other hand, involve
their Marines in the decision making process,
asking their advice, but retaining the final
decision for themselves." [Ref. 38, p. 15]
Traditional and authoritarian leadership is not
supportive of successful OD efforts. While they tend to
view people in terms of McGregor's Theory X (i.e., people
need direction and coercion to insure organizational
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efficiency), OD views people in terms of Theory Y (i.e.,
people have valuable contributions to make and do desire
to improve themselves and their work). [Ref. 58, Ch. 1-4]
The philosophical premises of traditional and authoritarian
leadership would tend to resist (and possibly prohibit)
effective OD interventins.
2) Organizational Structure - Although it is the
smallest of the major Armed Forces, the Marine Corps must
still coordinate the efforts and assure communications
between numerous, complex elements in order to accomplish
its primary mission. To interface its component units, the
Marine Corps is organized as a hierarchical bureaucracy.
The chain of command is firmly delineated and its employ-
ment is emphasized to insure coordination of effort. The
management of the Marine bureaucratic structure appears to
be heavily influenced by the methods and philosophies of
scientific management which Basil and Cook (1974) define to
be: central emphasis on efficiency; task specialization
and task interrelationships; the motivational devices of
extrinsic rewards such as income and status; and the
sturctured and systematic form of rationality for organization
control. [Ref. 6, p. 61]
Promotions within this hierarchy are a function
of merit, past accomplishments, and seniority. Formal
authority is a function of rank. Command positions are
sought and coveted as career-enhancing. Command success
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is based upon the formal criterion of accomplishment of
mission. However, it appears to be simultaneously influenced
by the informal criterion of favorable interactions with
reporting seniors. These favorable interactions with
reporting seniors may sometimes take the form of easing
the anxieties of seniors by assuring them that events are
"on track" and "under control". Consequently, commanders
may tend to tell their superiors what they want to hear
instead of revealing harsh reality. Although this is con-
trary to official policy and professional integrity, human
nature is predictable to the extent that men will tend to
act in what they perceive to be their best interests.
Therefore, it appears reasonable to conclude that commanders
may be tempted to emphasize the positive aspects of their
organizations while omitting disfavorable information.
Due to the competition for advancement, commanders may be
reluctant to "upset" their reporting seniors by disclosing
negative events that they themselves can later reconcile
"in house" or which may somehow disappear on their own
accord. OD interventions would be handicapped due to such
pressures which tend to promote the absence of valid,
candid feedback.
Marine officers are rewarded on the basis of
relatively short term assignments. Consequently, there may
be a reluctance to "rock the boat" and a tendency to continue
with the existing status quo provided it is not too dys-
functional. Leaders often seem more willing to react to
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crises than to undertake proactive measures that are often
difficult, time consuming, and uncertain in outcome. Perhaps
this is because leaders view organizational conflict as
unhealthy, a personal embarrassment, and reflective of
leadership failure. OD efforts are not receptive to an
atmosphere which seeks to avoid conflict and views it as an
organization "ill". Successful OD programs depend upon an
open recognition of conflict as unavoidable in organizational
life and a desire to positively manage conflict situations.
The rank structure of the Marine Corps hierarchy
can also deter the successful introduction of OD. Rank
generally determines position of authority. In particular,
a commander's interest in OD may be frustrated by lower
level leaders who are resistant to the philosophies of OD.
Due to personnel shortages, administrative/legal restrictions,
and the relative inflexibility of the rank structure, a
commander may be forced to "make do" with subordinate
leaders who are opposed to OD. It is usually impossible to
immediately "fire" such leaders, demote them in rank, and
promote OD-supporting personnel to replace them.
3) Resource Constraints - As opposed to the other
Armed Services, the Marine Corps incorporates fewer supporting,
administrative, and logistical organizations. There is a
relatively short "body" between its "teeth" and its "tail".
The Marine Corps is perhaps more restricted than the other
services by resource constraints. The Corps has always
emphasized the frugality of its operations. Hence, the
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introduction of wide-spread OD efforts would be severely
limited by resource constraints. Moreover, the Marine Corps
probably lacks personnel expertise in OD methods; there
are few serving officers and NCOs who could organize,
implement, and monitor an OD program. Simultaneously,
current budgetary constraints would hinder the employment
of external OD consultants.
4) The Concept of the Marine Corps as a "Being" -
OD practitioners advocate that an organization's strength
and vitality is increased by tapping the commitment of
personnel through a process of conflict management. Indi-
vidual goals are not seen as subservient to organization
goals. In this sense, the organization is seen as a creature
of the individuals within it. Yet, there appears to be a
tendency in the Marine Corps to view the Corps as separate
and discrete from the individuals within it. The Marine
Corps is possibly seen as an "organizational being" which
is "alive" in itself. The Corps is an image which every
Marine must strive to meet. Marine Corps traditions and
heritage may tend to further anthropomorphize the organization
There is a popular conception that this "organizational being"
is composed of the spirit and values of such former Marines
as "Chesty" Puller, Archibald Henderson, H.M. Smith, etc.
The individual Marine of today - whether he be from the
ghetto or the farm - is expected to live up to the tradition
of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps was "alive" before
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this current generation of Marines and will continue to
"life" after their departure. Although it is realized that
the Corps 1 combat effectiveness fully depends upon the
prowess and skill of the individual marine, the Corps is
looked on as "more" than the sum of its components. This
syndrome holds the Corps up as an ideal to which every
Marine should try to ascribe. It represents a binding
force and has facilitated espirit d 1 corps.
There appears to be a deep belief in the Marine
Corps that Marines are the repository of traditional military
values. The Corps cherishes that it symbolizes all that's
best in soldierly virtues: loyalty, strict obedience,
discipline, and the necessity to subjegate oneself to the
"greater whole". It may be speculated that many career
Marines look upon the Corps as a "calling" or a vocation
instead of merely a profession. This philosophy of "true
believing" demands external symbols as proof of inner
commitment: short hair acting as a surrogate tonsure;
precise tailoring and wearing of the uniform; strict stan-
dards of weight control and physical fitness; and subjugation
of many personal mannerisms while in uniform. These external
symbols are generally enforced under threat of personal
censure.
OD intervention would be frustrated by the exis-
tance of such a culture that would view the organization
and its members as separate "individuals" and elevate the
organization as a "greater being". Moreover, OD efforts
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would be handicapped to the degree that leaders emphasized
the separation of individual goals and organizational goals.
However, this author wonders if today's young Marine (the
product of his external society) is fully willing to "buy
into" this possible internal culture? Are Junior Marines
willing to replace their individual expectations for the
goals of the organization? Are they content to be passive
followers amenable to traditional or authoritarian leadership?
Perhaps today's personnel turmoil and disciplinary problems
indicate a "no" response. If this is indeed the case, and
if the current leadership training program proves unable
to resolve the Corps' personnel problems, then carefully-
tailored OD efforts (despite the forces mitigating against
it) may prove to be the "only horse in the barn".
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FURTHER ACTION AND RESEARCH
It is the conclusion of this author that OD as presently
practiced in industrial settings and academic laboratory
environments would not be feasible in the Marine Corps.
Indeed, this author believes, the transposition of such
methods onto the existing leadership training program could
result in dysfunctional and counterproductive effects. Aside
from the cultural and structural forces currently mitigating
against "textbook" OD in the Marine Corps, this author
proposes that civilian-oriented OD programs would primarily
fail due to the fundamental mission of the Marine Corps:
The Marine Corps is a combat-oriented organization which
(unlike other services which allow cadres of virtually
non-combatant personnel) requires that every man possess
the capacity to fight. While OD efforts as generally
practiced in civilian settings encourage open discussion
of conflict and actively strive towards collaborative
management, the combat mission of the Marine Corps necessi-
tates that strict traditional leadership methods be ever
present. While the Marine Corps could possibly cultivate
a thin, temporary veneer of collaborative leadership, the
pressures, uncertainties, and frequent chaos of combat
situations seem to require that traditional leadership remain
closely beneath such a surface. Moreover, combat success
demands strict obedience to orders and allows neither time
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nor resources to manage inter-unit conflict. Civilian-
oriented OD methods would not meet these realities of the
Marine Corps. However, this author believes, while "textbook"
OD could not be employed carte blanche
, OD theory does con-
tain an important concept which would be beneficial to the
Marine Corps: opening and expanding increased channels of
effective communication. Although this is but one of many
OD concepts, this author believes that it is the most feasi-
ble and beneficial one given the realities of the Corps'
mission, culture, and resource constraints.
In order to upgrade and improve channels of communication
both vertically and horizontally within the Marine Corps,
the author recommends that the existing leadership training
program be modified in the following ways
:
A. Group discussion leaders should be assigned their
responsibilities as a full-time duty. At the present, group
discussion leaders engage in this important work as a secon-
dary duty. Since their military advancement chiefly depends
upon their quality performance in their primary duties,
there may be a high probability that group discussion leaders
devote the majority of their time, attention, and effort to
their primary duties. Consequently, their tasks as discussion
leaders may only be addressed as "time permits" or as an
"afterthought" to their primary duty. Under these circum-
stances the quality of the leadership training program will
probably suffer since its success is greatly dependent upon
the skill and interest of the discussion leaders.
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B. The leadership training program should be amended
to allow fuller discussion of local problematic issues.
As presently conducted, the leadership training program
tends to skirt personnel conflicts and avoid local problems.
As one Marine Corps officer commented:
"... leadership taught to Marines today
is concerned with traits and principles.
What is not being taught are human behavior
skills essential for successful interpersonal
relationships ... in order to better under-
stand people and to supervise effectively,
we must know the needs and goals of men . .
.
a leader must understand the various needs
and goals of men ... a leader must under-
stand the various needs that people have
in order to predict their behavior in
various situations ..." [Ref. 56, p. 36]
This author believes that subordinate personnel would be
increasingly receptive to the leadership training program
if they saw it as a vehicle for expressing and addressing
local needs and problems. Indeed, perhaps many Marines
are "turned off" by the seemingly deliberate avoidance of
local issues and conditions. They may possibly see the
current program as "hypocritical" and "less than honest"
by its ostensive refusal to deal directly with immediate
leadership concerns. For example, the nineteen year old
Lance Corporal may be more interested in his perceived
grievances and misunderstandings relating to his platoon
sergeant than in the phenomenon of Communism. Consequently,
this author believes that when local problems are displaced
with subjects not immediately relevant to local leadership
conflicts, many Marines receive little benefit from the program
and merely "go through the motions".
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This author believes that if the leadership training
program did reserve at least one day of discussion to
address local problems, inter-organizational channels of
communications would be improved. Both superiors and
subordinates would gain increased awareness of potentially
crippling problems
. Through frank communication and open
feedback, many embarrassing or dysfunctional events could
be avoided. Although many problems surfaced during the
discussion could be beyond the ability of the local command
to resolve, a significant number could be locally remedied.
Moreover, the fact that Marines perceive that the Command
is truly interested in sources of local conflict (and does
not merely wish that they disappear) could in itself be a
source of positive motivation.
C. To open channels of communication via frank discussion
of local unit problems would require skillful management
by carefully trained discussion leaders. Since the majority
of discussion leaders are trained at LID, Quantico, this
author recommends that members of LID's faculty receive
training in the normaltive-re-educative model of OD with
particular concentration on conflict resolution and team-
building activities. This author suggests that the proper
source of this training should be in the human resources
management curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
.
Unlike civilian institutions, NPS is able to provide more
practical and functional guidance in the application of
these techniques to a strictly military environment. LID
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faculty so trained could subsequently instruct and assist
discussion leaders in the effective management of local
problem resolution.
This author realizes that direct discussion of local
unit conflicts through the employment of full-time discussion
leaders carefully trained in specific aspects of OD is but
a modest introduction of OD efforts. However, this author
believes, a limited and specifically tailored introduction
of OD which seeks to explore the sources of local conflict
is the only feasible way of gaining the potential benefits
of OD. Yet, even this small introduction of OD will be
doomed to failure unless commanders fully support and
actively assist their discussion leaders.
Clearly, much more study and research is needed to
develop and implement this framework proposed by this author.
However, this author firmly believes that the team-building
and conflict-resolving techniques of OD can result in great
potential benefit to the Marine Corps not only on the
micro-level but also on the macro-level (as, for example,
in enhancing communications and mutual support between
dissimilar tenent activities sharing a common installation.)
The espirit d 1 corps and personnel commitment that promote
combat effectiveness can be strengthened by such limited OD
efforts specifically tailored to the unique needs of the
Marine Corps. Probably the most positive by-product that
could emerge would be upgraded self-esteem for both officers
and enlisted men and a greater degree of trust and comradeship
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between superiors and the men they command. This, after
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